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differences were not unreasonable except some allowances.
 In addition, the art. 20 of LCA was to be deleted and the content of the 
article was integrated into the art. 8 of the new Part-time Workers and 
Fixed-term Workers Act by the reform adopted in 2018 （effective on April 
1st, 2020）. This judgment will be referred to under the new act as a judicial 
precedent.
7.　International Law and Organizations
Claim for revocation of administrative disposition regarding 
non-recognition of refugee status 
Tokyo District Court, July 5, 2018,
Case no. （gyo u） 524 of 2015
Summary:
 The case deals with the refugee status recognition of a Sri Lankan man 
（the “Plaintiff”）. Prior to this case, the Plaintiff applied to the Minister of 
Justice （the “MOJ”） for formal refugee status recognition, which was 
rejected by the MOJ through an administrative disposition. Following such 
rejection, the Plaintiff filed an action requesting the revocation of the 
administrative disposition to the Osaka District Court. Then the Osaka 
District Court rendered its judgment where it revoked the MOJ’s 
administrative disposition as it recognized the Plaintiff’s refugee status, 
due to his relationship with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam （the 
“LTTE”）. However, despite such recognition, the MOJ issued another 
administrative disposition not recognizing the Plaintiff’s status because it 
views the situation in Sri Lanka as having improved since May 2009. The 
Plaintiff formally objected, but the MOJ denied it. Consequently, the 
Plaintiff filed another action to the Tokyo District Court （the “Court”） to 
request for revocation of the second administrative disposition, among 
others.
 In rendering its judgment, the Court reasoned as follows. Since the 
Plaintiff’s refugee status had been recognized by the Osaka District Court, 
the question then becomes whether at the time when the second 
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administrative disposition was issued his refugee status had ceased to 
apply in light of Art. 1 C （5） of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees as modified by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees （the “Protocol”） （collectively, the “Refugee Convention”）. 
Having considered various reports of third-parties on the situations in Sri 
Lanka after the civil war ended on May 2009, the Court concluded that the 
re fugee s ta tus has no t ceased . The Cour t revoked the second 
administrative disposition and obliged the MOJ to recognize the Plaintiff 
as a refugee. 
Reference:
Art. 3 & 37-3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act
Art. 61-2 of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act
Art. 1 of the Refugee Convention
Facts:
 The Plaintiff was born in Sri Lanka and is a Tamil. His hometown is 
Jaffna, a city located in the northern part of Sri Lanka. He established a 
company in 1992, and in 2004 moved his residence to close to Colombo. 
Due to the civil war that was raging in Sri Lanka, the Plaintiff illegally 
immigrated to Japan on September 17, 2006. He was then found to be in 
violation of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and was 
put into detention. On April 19, 2007, the Plaintiff received Provisional 
Release from detention. On October 2, 2006, in detention, the Plaintiff 
made an application to the MOJ to formally recognize his refugee status 
based on Ar t . 61 -2 （1） o f the Immigrat ion Contro l and Refugee 
Recognition Act. This was rejected by the MOJ through an administrative 
disposition on November 9, 2006. Additionally, a written deportation order 
was also issued to the Plaintiff. He then filed an action for revocation of the 
administrative disposition and declaration of nullity of the written 
deportation order to the Osaka District Court on August 3, 2007. 
 On March 30, 2011, the Osaka District Court recognized the Plaintiff’s 
refugee status at the time when the administrative disposition was issued. 
The court took note that many Tamils, particularly those from the 
northern part of Sri Lanka were threatened, arrested, confined, tortured, 
abducted and murdered by the armed forces, the LTTE and other 
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insurgents. Those suspected to be related to the LTTE were likely to be 
abducted and/or murdered by the state-sponsored “white vans”. During a 
visit to his hometown in around September 2004, the Plaintiff received a 
visit from the LTTE who asked for his cooperation. Around 2006, the white 
vans abducted and/or murdered his colleagues and relatives, and visited 
his residence and company multiple times. The visits continued even after 
the Plaintiff immigrated to Japan. Considering all the above, the Osaka 
District Court recognizes him as a refugee under both the Refugee 
Convention and the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. 
Accordingly, the Osaka District Court revoked the MOJ’s administrative 
disposition and nullified the written deportation order. After that, the 
Plaintiff was permitted to have a provisional stay. On May 30, 2011, the 
Refugee Inquirer of the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau conducted a 
hearing in relation to the Plaintiff’s refugee status application. Such an 
application was again rejected through an administrative disposition dated 
December 5, 2011. The Plaintiff filed an objection to the MOJ for the re-
rejection on December 12, 2011, which was denied on April 17, 2015. 
Following this, on June 30, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the action to the Court 
for revocation of the second administrative disposition, nullification of 
MOJ’s denial towards his objection, and a mandamus obliging the MOJ to 
formally recognize his refugee status.
Opinions:
1. The burden of proof in relation to the Plaintiff’s status
 In determining whether or not the Court should revoke the MOJ’s 
administrative disposition dated December 5, 2011, the Court must focus 
on whether the refugee status has ceased to apply under Art. 1 C （5） of the 
Refugee Convention. Different from cases involving someone who has not 
been recognized as a refugee, the burden is on the state to prove that the 
refugee status has ceased.
2. The Plaintiff’s status as a refugee 
 Under Art. 1 C （5） of the Refugee Convention, the Court needs to 
assess whether the circumstances in connection with the ground for the 
Plaintiff’s status recognition has ceased to exist at the time that the 
administrative disposition was issued. The answer to this question 
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requires the consideration of facts. The Court relied on reports prepared 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees （the “UNHCR”）, 
NGOs, and other governments. Having considered these reports, the 
Court found that it is true that after the civil war between Sri Lanka’s 
government and the LTTE in May 2009, the security condition in Sri Lanka 
generally and for those Tamils who are not suspected to be related to the 
LTTE has been improving. However, the situation is different for the 
Plaintiff. From the reports, it can be concluded that Tamils who are 
suspected to be related with the LTTE during the civil war are in danger of 
being detained and tortured by Sri Lanka’s government. The Japanese 
government objected to such a conclusion by arguing that only those who 
are deeply related to the LTTE （such as ex-members, direct supporters, 
etc.） are at risk of such danger. This argument was rejected by the Court 
who concluded that the reports suggest that Sri Lanka’s government is 
likely to detain and torture even those who barely had any relationship 
with the LTTE. Further, the risk of detention and torture is higher for 
those who fled abroad and then returned to Sri Lanka. Considering all of 
the above, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s refugee status has not 
yet ceased to apply. 
3. Decisions on the Plaintiff’s requests
 Since the Plaintiff is a refugee and remains one at the time the 
administrative disposition dated December 5, 2011, was issued, the 
administrative disposition is deemed illegal and is revoked. Further, since 
the requirements stipulated under Art. 37-3 of the Administrative Case 
Litigation Act are met, the Court obliges the Defendant to formally 
recognize the Plaintiff’s status as a refugee. 
Editorial Note:
 The case summarized above exhibits the difficulties inherent in the 
determination of refugee status and when such a status can be said to have 
ceased to apply. To qualify as a refugee, one must meet the definition of a 
refugee under Art. 1 A （2） of the Refugee Convention. There are three 
requirements, namely: （1） there must be a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted （for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion）, （2） he or she is outside the 
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country of his or her nationality, and （3） he or she is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of the state of origin. While the 
latter two requirements are relatively easily satisfied, the main difficulty 
lies with the first requirement. The Refugee Convention does not define or 
explain the meaning （Takane Sugihara, Lectures on International Law 444-
447 （2nd ed., 2013））. 
 It is helpful to divide the first requirement and discuss “well-founded 
fear” and “being persecuted” separately. As to the former, to the element 
of “fear” there is the qualification of “well-founded”. This means that not 
only that the state of mind （subjective condition） of the person concerned 
must be considered, but it must be supported by the objective situation 
（UN High Commissioner for Refugees （UNHCR）, Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on 
International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees , ¶ 38 , HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4 
（February 2019））. The degree of importance put on the elements in 
relation to each other may be different between states. The courts in Japan 
put more weight on the objective element, which is more restrictive 
（Sugihara, supra, 445-446）. This affects refugee status determination 
status in practice. 
 As to the concept of “being Persecuted”, the modern understanding of 
persecution is that there must be serious harm and failure of state 
protection. The examples of serious harm are the risks to physical 
security, encompassing risks to life; torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment; slavery; or other forms of physical violence. The 
risk of arrest, detention or prosecution requires further qualifications to be 
regarded as serious harm. Moreover because the international protection 
offered by The Refugee Convention is substitute protection, the notion of 
“being persecuted” requires an assessment of whether the state is 
unwilling or unable to protect the individual. The State’s unwillingness to 
protect clearly manifests when the state itself is responsible for the 
infliction of serious harm, or in the case where it tolerates or encourages 
non-state actors where it stands by despite being able to intervene. On the 
other hand, the most straightforward example of a state being unable to 
protect is where the state has failed or ceased to function （James C. 
Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 288-323 （2nd ed., 
Developments in 2018 ̶ Judicial Decisions 127
2014））. 
 The formal recognition of refugee status by the state of refuge is 
merely declaratory in nature. Once the refugee status has been recognized 
by the state of refuge, the status persists until it ceases, under one of the 
various situations defined under Art. 1 C. Cessation under Art. 1 C can be 
grounded either on the voluntary or individual acts of the refugee, or also 
on the existence of a change of circumstances in the state of origin （Joan 
Fitzpatrick & Rafael Bonoan, Cessation of Refugee Protection, in Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection 492-530 （Erike Feller, et al. eds., 2003））. For our 
purpose, we will focus on the latter as covered under Art. 1 C （5）. The 
state of refuge has the prerogative to declare cessation under Art. 1 C （5） 
if it found that the circumstances upon which the refugee status was 
recognized have ceased to exist, and that national protection is once more 
available in the state of origin. To do so there are five considerations that 
must be taken into account by the state of refuge, namely that the change 
of circumstances （1） must be a change in the “objective situation” in the 
home country, （2） must be “fundamental” or of substantial political 
significance, （3） must have actually occurred, （4） must have taken place 
on a durable basis, and （5） must impact the refugee himself （Hathaway & 
Foster, supra, 481-485）. The burden of proof on the application of the 
cessation clause lies on the state of refuge （Guy. S. Goodwin-Gill, The 
Refugee in International Law 87 （2nd ed., 1996））.
 In our view, the Court’s assessment is in line with the generally agreed 
understanding on refugee status determination and cessation summarized 
above. Considering the facts summarized below, it is hard to conclude that 
Art. 1 C （5） applies in the Plaintiff’s case. While it is true that the civil war 
in Sri Lanka has ended as of May 2009 and the overall conditions have 
improved, this alone is insufficient to conclude the Plaintiff’s well-founded 
fear of being persecuted has ceased to exist. Based on the reports by 
NGOs and other governments, Tamils who have a similar personal 
background to the Plaintiff and are suspected to be related to the LTTE, 
even if they are only remotely related, have found themselves arrested, 
detained, and tortured even after the civil war ended. There is a high 
likelihood of the Plaintiff being subjected to such risks if he returns to Sri 
Lanka considering that he has been targeted even before he left for Japan 
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for his known relationship with the LTTE. Further, until today the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act （the “PTA”） is still applicable in Sri Lanka. 
Under the PTA, arrests for unspecified “unlawful activities” without a 
warrant is allowed, and detention for up to 18 months without the 
authorities producing the suspect before a court is permitted. Recently, 
Amnesty International stated that widespread incidents of violence against 
detainees, including torture and other ill-treatment, practiced throughout 
the country mainly by the police can still be routinely found （Amnesty 
Int’l, Amnesty International Annual Report 2017/18: The State of the 
World’s Human Rights, at. 342-344 （February 22, 2018））. This is further 
supported by the statement made by the former UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism in 2017 that “the use of torture has 
been, and remains today, endemic and routine, for those arrested and 
detained on national security grounds” （Human Rights Watch, Locked Up 
Without Evidence: Abuses under Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act 
（Apr. 25, 2019, 20:05 AM）, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/29/
locked-without-evidence/abuses-under-sri-lankas-prevention-terrorism-
act）. Considering all the above, objectively it is difficult to claim that 
Plaintiff’s well-founded fear of being persecuted has ceased to exist.
